In a highly significant ruling that addresses the constitutional boundaries between executive mercy and judicial finality, the Supreme Court of Nigeria has overridden the pardon granted by President Bola Tinubu to Maryam Sanda, who was convicted of the murder of her husband, Bilyaminu Bello.

The court, in a split decision on Friday, affirmed the death sentence by hanging originally handed down to Sanda.

Maryam Sanda, an Abuja-based house wife, was sentenced to death by hanging in 2020 by a High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) for fatally stabbing her husband, Bilyaminu Bello, during a domestic dispute in 2017.

Her conviction was later upheld by the Court of Appeal in Abuja. The tragic and high-profile nature of the case had sparked widespread national debate regarding domestic violence and justice in Nigeria.

The constitutional conflict arose recently when President Tinubu, exercising the executive prerogative of mercy, reduced Sanda’s sentence to 12 years imprisonment, citing "compassionate grounds" and "the best interest of the children."

This act of clemency was carried out while Sanda’s final appeal against her conviction was still pending before the Supreme Court.

In its judgment, the Apex Court, in a four-to-one majority decision, resolved all issues raised in Sanda’s appeal and dismissed it for lacking merit, thereby upholding the decisions of the lower courts.

Justice Moore Adumein, delivering the lead judgment, held that the prosecution had successfully proved the case of culpable homicide beyond a reasonable doubt, validating the Court of Appeal's decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Crucially, the Supreme Court also addressed the constitutional impropriety of the executive action. Justice Adumein held that it was fundamentally wrong for the Executive to attempt to exercise its power of pardon or reprieve over a case of culpable homicide while an appeal relating to that conviction was still pending before the highest court.

This part of the ruling clarifies the principle that the judicial process must be fully exhausted before the executive prerogative of mercy can be legitimately invoked in such capital offences, maintaining the separation of powers and the integrity of the judicial system.